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CASE COMMENTS
FALSE STATEMENTS V. FREE DEBATE: IS THE FIRST
AMENDMENT A LICENSE TO LIE IN ELECTIONS?
Rickert v. Public Disclosure Commission, 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007)
Simon A. Rodell*
The petitioner, Marilou Rickert, ran as a Green Party candidate for a
seat in the Washington state senate.1 During her campaign, Rickert
distributed a brochure that falsely represented the voting record of her
opponent, incumbent Senator Tim Sheldon.2 Sheldon filed a complaint
with the Washington Public Disclosure Commission (PDC)—the
governor-appointed commission charged with enforcing Washington’s
false-campaign-speech statute.3 The statute prohibited sponsorship, with
“actual malice,” of “[p]olitical advertising or an electioneering
communication that contains a false statement of material fact about a
candidate for public office.”4 Several months after Sheldon’s landslide
* J.D. 2008, University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.B.A. 2008, University of Florida
Hough Graduate School of Business. Thank you to my many friends on the Florida Law Review for
your support and friendship. Thank you especially to Dustin Hall for your help with this Comment,
and for being such a great friend and advisor. For my best friend and fiancée, Jessica Mueller.
1. Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n (Rickert II), 168 P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007). In
2002, Rickert ran against incumbent Senator Tim Sheldon, a Democrat. See Brad Shannon, Judge
Backs Fine Against Green Party Candidate, OLYMPIAN (Olympia, WA), Apr. 24, 2004, at 1C.
2. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 827–28. Specifically, the brochure stated that Rickert supported
“‘social services for the most vulnerable of the state’s citizens’” but that Sheldon “‘voted to close
a facility for the developmentally challenged in his district.’” Id. at 827. In an administrative
hearing before the Washington Public Disclosure Commission (PDC), Rickert testified that the
facility to which she referred in her brochure was a youth camp in Belfair, Washington. Rickert v.
Pub. Disclosure Comm’n (Rickert I), 119 P.3d 379, 381 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). However, Sheldon
twice voted against the bill mandating closure of the camp. Id.
3. See Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 827. The five members of the PDC serve five-year terms and
are appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 42.17.350(1)–(2) (West 2008).
4. The statute provides, in relevant part:
(1) It is a violation of this chapter for a person to sponsor with actual malice:
(a) Political advertising or an electioneering communication that contains a false
statement of material fact about a candidate for public office. However, this
subsection (1)(a) does not apply to statements made by a candidate or the
candidate’s agent about the candidate himself or herself;
....
(2) Any violation of this section shall be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
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re-election, the PDC held an administrative hearing to investigate the
complaint.5 The PDC imposed a $1,000 fine, concluding that the brochure
contained material false statements, that Rickert sponsored the brochure
with actual malice, and that her violation of the statute had been proven by
clear and convincing evidence.6 A Washington superior court judge upheld
the fine,7 but the Washington Court of Appeals reversed.8 Applying strictscrutiny review9 to the statute, the Washington Supreme Court HELD that
the statute was unconstitutional because it caused “the government, rather
than the people, [to] be the final arbiter of truth in political debate.”10
Before Washington passed the statute, candidates could turn only to
defamation law when someone made a false statement about them.
Defamation law allows an individual to recover in tort for injury to his
reputation.11 The tort allows an individual “to vindicate his good name”
and to obtain redress for harm caused by defamatory false statements.12 A
statement is defamatory “if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him.”13 To recover for defamation in
§ 42.17.530, invalidated by Rickert II, 168 P.3d 826. Under the statute, “‘actual malice’ means to
act with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.” Id. § 42.17.020(1);
see also infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
5. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 828; Rickert I, 119 P.3d at 381 (“Senator Sheldon was
re-elected . . . by approximately 79 percent of the vote.”).
6. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 828. Under the statute, the PDC has authority to determine whether
a violation has occurred and to “issue and enforce an appropriate order following such
determination.” § 42.17.395(1).
7. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 828; Shannon, supra note 1.
8. Rickert I, 119 P.3d at 380.
9. Courts “apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 642 (1994). Under typical “strict scrutiny” analysis, the government must prove that the
regulation at issue is necessary to further a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). The Supreme Court has also formulated the
standard as requiring a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored means. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.5
(3d ed. 2006) (describing the various levels of scrutiny applied in constitutional litigation).
10. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 827.
11. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2-3
(2007) (“‘At its core, an action for defamation is intended to protect an individual’s interest in
maintaining a good reputation.’” (quoting West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah
1994))). Defamation law includes two torts: libel and slander. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 1:10 (2d ed. 2007). At common law, libel provided redress for defamation “by
written or printed words, or by the embodiment of the communication in some tangible or physical
form . . . .” Id. § 1:11. Slander provided redress for defamation by spoken words or by “transitory
gestures.” Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977) (distinguishing between
libel and slander).
12. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); see also SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 4:1
(noting that another “popular approach is to define ‘defamatory’ by stringing together a long litany
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Washington, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant made a false
statement about the plaintiff; (2) there was an unprivileged communication
of the statement; (3) the defendant made the statement negligently,
recklessly, or intentionally; and (4) the statement damaged the plaintiff’s
reputation.14 For public officials—and for candidates for public
office—reputation is especially important.15 Recognizing the importance
of reputation, the common law “presumed” damages from a defamatory
statement, allowing a plaintiff to recover without proving actual damage
to his reputation.16
In contrast, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids
Congress or the states from passing any law “abridging the freedom of
speech.”17 “Freedom of speech is crucial in a democracy: Open discussion
of candidates is essential for voters to make informed selections in
elections; it is through speech that people can influence their government’s
choice of policies.”18 The trick, then, becomes finding the appropriate
of colorful pejoratives”); id. §§ 4:2–4:5 (describing various approaches to determining whether a
statement is defamatory). When “assessing whether a publication is susceptible to a defamatory
meaning, it is not dispositive that a numerical majority of its audience would arrive at a nondefamatory interpretation”—words may be actionable if they damage a person’s reputation “among
a considerable and respectable class of people.” Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 127 (1st Cir.
2006); SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 4:5.50 (describing the “reasonable” or “average” reader for
purposes of defamation law).
14. Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n (Rickert I), 119 P.3d 379, 384 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (“To create liability for
defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an
unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of
the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication.”); 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 21
(2008).
15. 15 SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 1:1 (describing the importance of reputation in AngloAmerican culture). The Supreme Court holds that criticism of candidates for public office is
accorded the same First Amendment protection as criticism of public officials. Monitor Patriot Co.
v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971) (“[I]t is abundantly clear that . . . publications concerning
candidates [for elective public office] must be accorded at least as much protection under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments as those concerning occupants of public office.”).
16. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (“The common law of
defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages
without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the
existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication.”).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press . . . .”). Under the incorporation doctrine, the First Amendment applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States.”).
18. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 11.1.2, at 926; see also Eu v. S.F. County Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (“[T]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent
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balance between allowing public officials to vindicate their reputations
through defamation law and protecting open discourse of political issues
under the First Amendment—discourse that would be chilled by potential
tort liability.19
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 the U.S. Supreme Court placed a
constitutional check on defamation law, holding that the First Amendment
limits a public official’s right to recover for defamation.21 In New York
Times, a civil-rights group paid for a full-page newspaper advertisement
asking for donations to support civil-rights protests by African American
college students in the South.22 The advertisement also contained factual
errors, including mischaracterizations of police actions in Montgomery,
Alabama.23
After the New York Times refused to retract the advertisement, L.B.
Sullivan—a Montgomery City Commissioner who supervised the city’s
police department—filed a libel suit against the newspaper and several
Alabama clergymen who purportedly endorsed the advertisement.24
Sullivan argued that the advertisement damaged his reputation by
criticizing the police force.25 The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, finding
it “common knowledge that the average person [would] know[] that
municipal agents, such as police and firemen, . . . are under the control and

application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” (quoting Monitor, 401 U.S.
at 272)).
19. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 11.3.5.2, at 1045.
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For an exhaustive review of this case, see ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE
NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1992); see also Thomas Kane, Note,
Malice, Lies, and Videotape: Revisiting New York Times v. Sullivan in the Modern Age of Political
Campaigns, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 755, 762–72 (1999).
21. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283.
22. Id. at 256–57. The advertisement stated three purposes for the funds: to support (1)
“‘thousands of Southern Negro students . . . engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in
positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution’”;
(2) “‘the struggle for the right-to-vote’”; and (3) the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
against a pending perjury indictment. Id. at 256–57.
23. Id. at 258–59. Several statements in the advertisement were false: The advertisement
stated that students had sung “My Country, ’Tis of Thee,” but the students actually sang the
National Anthem, id.; the advertisement stated that several students were expelled for leading a
demonstration at the Capitol, but the students were actually expelled for demanding service at a
courthouse lunch counter on another day, id. at 259; the advertisement stated that state authorities
had padlocked a dining hall on the Alabama State College campus “in an attempt to starve [the
students] into submission,” but the dining hall was never padlocked on any occasion, id. at 257,
259; the advertisement stated that “truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed”
the campus, but the police never “ringed” the campus and were not called to the campus as a result
of the demonstration at the Capitol, id.; finally, the advertisement stated that Dr. King had been
arrested seven times, but he was actually arrested only four times, id. at 258–59.
24. Id. at 256, 261.
25. Id. at 258.
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direction . . . of a single commissioner.”26 The Alabama Supreme Court
thus affirmed a $500,000 jury award for Sullivan, reasoning that the
advertisement constituted libel per se.27
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that Alabama’s defamation
law abridged the newspaper’s and the clergymen’s First Amendment
rights.28 The Court rejected Sullivan’s contention that the First
Amendment does not protect libelous publications, reasoning that the
state’s libel law must be measured “against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.”29 First, the Court reasoned that some
“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’
that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”30 Second, criticism that injures a
government official’s reputation cannot lose its constitutional protection
simply because it is defamatory—that is, defamatory statements must be
protected.31 The Court concluded that a public official seeking redress for
defamation must prove with “convincing clarity”32 that the statement was
made with “actual malice”—i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of its falsity.33 According to the Court, this
26. Id. at 263.
27. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256, 263. Under Alabama law, a publication was “‘libelous
per se’” if the words tended to injure a person’s reputation or bring him into public contempt. Id.
at 267; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (1977) (defining “actionable per se”). More
generally, libels per se include “[l]ibels whose defamatory meanings are apparent on their face.”
SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 7:22. At common law, libels per se do not require special damages. Id.
“[S]pecial harm” or “special damage” is a term of art in defamation law that “refers to ‘the loss of
something having economic or pecuniary value.’” Id. § 7:2; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 575 cmt. b (1977).
28. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292.
29. Id. at 268, 270. “[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.
It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.” Id. at 269.
30. Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
31. Id. at 273.
32. Id. at 285–86. The Court subsequently clarified that this language requires proof by “clear
and convincing evidence.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1974).
33. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80. “From the outset, the ‘actual malice’ label was an
infamously poor choice of words because the common law used the term ‘actual malice’
synonymously with ‘ill will,’ not reckless disregard of the truth.” Kane, supra note 20, at 774. The
Court subsequently clarified many aspects of the actual-malice standard. In Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court stated that, to meet the actual-malice standard, the defendant must
have uttered false statements with a “high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.” Id. at 74.
In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Louisiana Supreme Court applied an objective
recklessness test, finding that the defendant had acted with actual malice by making serious
accusations without verifying any of the factual assertions. Id. at 730. The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected this analysis and applied a subjective test: A publisher acts with actual malice if there is
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actual-malice standard properly balanced the competing interests of free
expression and reputation protection by immunizing some false
statements, such as honest misstatements, while compensating victims for
the most damaging false statements.34
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has continued to balance the
competing policies behind the First Amendment and defamation law. In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,35 the Court emphasized the importance of
vindicating private individuals’ reputations by holding that only public
figures must meet the difficult-to-prove actual-malice standard.36 Gertz
involved a magazine that published an article falsely asserting that the
plaintiff, a prominent local attorney, was a “Leninist” and a “Communistfronter.”37 After a jury awarded $50,000 to the plaintiff, the district court
entered judgment for the magazine notwithstanding the verdict.38 The
district court found that the plaintiff failed to meet the actual-malice
standard, reasoning that New York Times protects private individuals in
addition to public figures.39 The Supreme Court reversed and limited the
actual-malice standard to defamation cases brought by public officials and
public figures.40
The Gertz Court’s judgment reflects a balance of the competing
interests at stake. When criticism of public figures is involved, the First
Amendment has paramount importance.41 Despite the lack of
“constitutional value in false statements of fact,” the First Amendment
requires protecting “some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters.”42 Thus, to avoid media self-censorship, the Court reasoned that
the First Amendment should protect any false statement about public
figures made without actual malice.43 A state’s interest in compensating
public figures for harm to their reputations is minimal because they
generally have sufficient media access to reduce the impact of any
defamatory statement and because public figures voluntarily expose
themselves to the public eye.44 For private defamation victims, however,
“sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication.” Id. at 730–31.
34. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 278–83.
35. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
36. Id. at 347–48.
37. Id. at 325–26.
38. Id. at 329.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 332, 342. New York Times involved a public official—a city commissioner—but
the Supreme Court subsequently extended the New York Times standard to protect publications
about “public figures.” See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S.
130, 162 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring).
41. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340–41.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 340–42; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–45; see also SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 2:13 (discussing the
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the Court recognized a state’s legitimate interest in compensating injured
parties by giving states free rein to define appropriate standards of
liability, “so long as they do not impose liability without fault.”45
In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court balanced the
competing interests of free speech and reputation protection in a different
setting. Unlike New York Times and Gertz, which were defamation cases,46
the instant case involved a false-campaign-speech statute that allowed the
PDC, a government agency, to determine whether campaign statements are
false and to fine violators of the statute.47 According to the court, the
statute “erroneously ‘presupposes [that] the State possesses an independent
right to determine truth and falsity in political debate.’”48 The court noted
that the Washington legislature intended to limit the scope of the statute
to “the unprotected category of political defamation speech” identified by
New York Times.49 But because the statute did not require proof of the
defamatory nature of the speech, the court held that the statute covered
both protected (nondefamatory false statements) and unprotected
(defamatory false statements) speech.50 Because the statute limited
protected speech, the court applied strict scrutiny51 and invalidated the
statute because the legislature failed to identify a compelling government
interest and failed to narrowly tailor the statute to further such an interest.52
“access to media” argument); id. § 2:14 (discussing the “assumption of risk” rationale). But see
Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring
Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 860–61 (2006) (arguing that, in light of the proliferation of
the Internet, “courts should look to the plaintiff’s relative access to corrective counterspeech to
determine whether the actual malice standard is appropriate”).
45. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
46. Id. at 325; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271.
47. See Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n (Rickert II), 168 P.3d 826, 832, 847 (Wash.
2007); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.530 (West 2008), invalidated by Rickert II, 168
P.3d 826. For the text of the statute, see supra note 4.
The instant case is not the first time that the Washington Supreme Court has reviewed the
constitutionality of the statute. In Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No! Committee, 957
P.2d 691 (Wash. 1998), the court invalidated a previous version of the statute. Id. at 699. The old
statute prohibited sponsoring, with actual malice, political advertising that contains a false
statement of material fact. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.530 (West 1997). The court invalidated
the statute because it brought “within its sweep every maliciously false statement of ‘material fact’
whether it is defamatory to an individual or not.” 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 696. The
legislature subsequently amended the statute by limiting its proscription to false statements of
material fact “about a candidate for public office.” 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 304, § 2(1)(a).
48. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 827 (alteration in original) (quoting 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d
at 695).
49. Id. at 828.
50. Id. at 828–29.
51. Id. at 829; see also supra note 9 (listing the two elements of strict-scrutiny review of the
constitutionality of a statute: (1) the statute must be narrowly tailored and (2) necessary to further
a compelling government interest).
52. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 829–31; see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982)
(“When a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First
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The PDC proffered two government interests to support the statute:
(1) protecting candidates for public office; and (2) preserving the integrity
of elections.53 The court rejected the first interest, stating that “there
simply cannot be any legitimate, let alone compelling, interest in
permitting government censors to vet and penalize political speech about
issues or individual candidates.”54 Moreover, the state forfeited any
interest in compensating private individuals for harm to their reputations
because the statute lacked a mechanism to compensate victims—any fine
collected by the PDC went to the state.55 Finally, the court found that the
statute was neither narrowly tailored nor necessary to further the
government interest of protecting candidates, because the statute did not
require that the statement be of a kind that tends “to cause harm to an
individual’s reputation, i.e., defamatory.”56
The court also rejected the state’s proffered interest in preserving the
integrity of elections.57 The court acknowledged that the state could have
a compelling interest in protecting direct harm to elections, but found that
prohibiting “arguably false, but nondefamatory, statements about political
candidates to save our elections conflicts with the fundamental principles
of the First Amendment.”58 The court further asserted that the statute was
underinclusive59 because it did not apply to many statements that pose an
Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate
state interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operate without unnecessarily
circumscribing protected expression.”).
53. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 829–30.
54. Id. at 830 (emphasis omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 830–31.
58. Id. at 831.
59. The underinclusiveness argument in the instant case stems from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In R.A.V., the Supreme Court
invalidated a St. Paul ordinance that prohibited placing, on public or private property, a symbol or
object that “one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” Id. at 380, 396. In an attempt to save
the constitutionality of the ordinance, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the ordinance
narrowly, limiting its application to fighting words. Id. at 381. Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia reasoned that “[t]he First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions
on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.” Id. at 391. The ordinance was
underinclusive because it applied “only to ‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender,’” and permitted “[d]isplays containing abusive
invective, no matter how vicious or severe, . . . unless they are addressed to one of the specified
disfavored topics.” Id. Further, the statute sanctioned viewpoint discrimination because it permitted
proponents of tolerance and equality to display the disfavored symbols or objects while forbidding
the use of a symbol to express a racist sentiment. Id. at 391–92. “St. Paul has no such authority to
license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules.” Id. at 392. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57
FLA. L. REV. 843, 849 (2005) (arguing that, when addressing content-based restrictions on
unprotected speech, courts should ask (1) “whether a content-based regulation of unprotected
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equal threat to the integrity of elections; the statute exempted all
statements made by a candidate about himself, allowing a candidate to lie
freely about himself but prohibiting his opponent from making the same
statement.60 This exemption demonstrated that the statute was not narrowly
tailored to protect the integrity of elections.61
The four dissenting justices asserted that the majority had invited
politicians “to lie with impunity.”62 According to the dissent, the actualmalice standard “is both a necessary and a sufficient standard for
regulating false campaign speech.”63 The dissent argued that calculated
falsehoods and deliberate lies subvert the political process and are
unprotected by the First Amendment.64 Thus, the New York Times actualmalice standard would properly balance the First Amendment
constitutional concerns with the Washington legislature’s asserted
interests.65 The dissent reasoned that Washington’s statute was
constitutional because it addressed only statements about public officials
and candidates for public office, and it required the PDC to prove by clear
and convincing evidence both the falsity of the statement and actual
malice.66 The dissent argued that the actual-malice standard would not
subvert political speech because it is an intentionally difficult standard to
satisfy, and that applying the standard “will beneficially serve the voters,
the candidates, and the democratic process.”67
The Washington Supreme Court’s analysis reflects the omnipresent
constitutional tension between defamation law and the First Amendment.
The majority’s first concern—that Washington’s statute does not require
the false statement to be defamatory—can be easily fixed by the
legislature. But the real disagreement in the instant case arises from a more
fundamental issue. Some commentators view Washington’s falsespeech relates substantially to a harm of the same nature, but more compelling, than that against
which the larger unprotected speech category is directed” and (2) whether “a regulation threatens
protected speech in a manner not likely to be identified through a general standard.”).
60. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 831.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 833 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 840. The dissent relied heavily on Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982), and
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), to support its assertion that the actual-malice standard
is necessary and sufficient for regulating false campaign speech. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 836–37
(Madsen, J., dissenting). This reliance is misplaced. In Brown, the Court invalidated a statute
lacking both an actual-malice requirement and a requirement that the statement be defamatory. 456
U.S. at 54, 61–62. And in Garrison, the statements at issue were both true and defamatory. 379
U.S. at 66, 76. The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the appropriate protection for false but
nondefamatory statements made about public officials. See Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 830 n.7.
64. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 837–38 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 840–43.
66. Id. at 841; see also CHEMERINKSY, supra note 9, § 11.3.5.2, at 1046 (listing the four
constitutional requirements for defamation claims by public officials).
67. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 844 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
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campaign-speech statute as the first step toward allowing Big Brother, in
the form of the PDC and the Washington legislature, to curb First
Amendment rights.68 Meanwhile, the dissent believes that modern
elections have gone haywire and that Washington’s statute is necessary to
protect our democratic government from lying politicians.69
The majority’s first concern can be resolved by amending the statute.
The majority asserted that nondefamatory false statements about public
figures made with actual malice are protected by the First Amendment.70
Because all the cases discussing defamatory statements arose from
defamation cases, the majority asserted that a statement must be
defamatory—i.e., cause injury—to lose its constitutional protection.71 The
Washington legislature can fix this concern by inserting language into the
statute requiring that the false statements be defamatory. Indeed, the
legislature has already proposed amendments to its statute,72 and the
sixteen other states with similar laws can surely conform their statutes to
address this concern.73
68. Editorial, Debate Must Thrive in Our Political Battles: Lying About Opponents is in the
Great American Political Tradition, NEWS-SENTINEL (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Oct. 8, 2007 [hereinafter
Debate Must Thrive] (“The best way to sort out lies is through robust debate, which government
should not interfere with.”); Editorial, Spinners, Sinners and Campaign Lies, NEWS TRIBUNE
(Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 7, 2007, at 2 (“An unelected panel of governor’s appointees—the
PDC—certainly shouldn’t serve as the designated truth squad in election season.”). See generally
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin Group 1961) (1949) (describing the experiences of Winton Smith,
a clerk of the Ministry of Truth, who runs afoul of Big Brother, the dictator of the totalitarian
government of Oceana).
69. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 833 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (“The majority opinion advances the
efforts of those who would turn political campaigns into contests of the best stratagems of lies and
deceit, to the end that honest discourse and honest candidates are lost in the maelstrom.”); see also
Debate Must Thrive, supra note 68 (“What happens now is the voters will be subjected to an
incredible onslaught of lies and misinformation at the end of campaigns.” (quoting Wash. Sen. Tim
Sheldon)); Joseph Turner, Honestly: Candidates May Lie: State Supreme Court Refuses to Police
Speech in Political Campaigns, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 5, 2007 (“The campaigns
are going to go further into the gutter, I think.” (quoting Wash. Sen. Tim Sheldon)).
70. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 828–29 & n.7.
71. Id. at 829–30 & n.7.
72. This addition will also likely force the legislature to remove the exception for a
candidate’s false statements about himself—presumably, a candidate is unlikely to publish a false
statement about himself with the intent to injure his own reputation. Both the Washington Senate
and the Washington House of Representatives have proposed these amendments to the statute since
Rickert II. See S.B. 6202, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); H.B. 2852, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2008). The absence of this language may be the reason that Washington declined to petition
this case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Presumably, the Washington Legislature will amend the
statute, and the Washington Supreme Court will have another opportunity to review the statute’s
validity—this time with the Legislature’s asserted interests squarely in issue.
73. For the other states’ statutes, see ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095 (West 2008); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1-13-109 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18:1463 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 42 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
211B.06 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-131
(2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-274(a)(8) (West 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2008);
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However, overcoming the court’s rejection of the Washington
legislature’s asserted government interests will be more difficult. The
Washington Supreme Court rightly recognized that, although
Washington’s statute incorporates the constitutional balance for
defamation cases struck by the New York Times standard,74 the government
interests at stake in New York Times change dramatically in the context of
false-campaign-speech statutes.75 As discussed in Gertz, the New York
Times standard balances the First Amendment rights of the press with the
state interest in compensating citizens for injuries to their reputations.76
But application of the statute in the instant case involves neither the press
nor any state interest in compensating defamation victims.
Plainly put, the Washington legislature failed to assert a compelling
government interest because the statute does not permit the PDC to
compensate victims of false statements. The statute asserts that its purpose
is “‘to provide protection for candidates for public office.’”77 Although the
statute presumably protects candidates from some criticism, it does not
allow candidates to collect for injuries caused by false statements.78
Without any compensatory interest to even the constitutional balance
reached in New York Times, the protection of the First Amendment
prevails.79 Further, although the Supreme Court has recognized a
legitimate government interest in compensating victims, it has never
recognized a legitimate interest in protecting candidates for political office
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (West 2007);
TENN. CODE ANN. §-2-19-142 (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (West 2007); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 3-8-11 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05 (West 2007).
74. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional balancing
in New York Times).
75. See Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 830 (noting that a state interest in compensating private
individuals cannot justify government-enforced censorship schemes like Washington’s
false-campaign-speech statute).
76. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–48 (1974).
77. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 829 (quoting 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 304, § 1(3)).
78. See id. at 830; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.390 (West 2008) (listing the remedies
available under the Washington false-campaign-speech statute).
79. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (“[A] State has a legitimate interest in
upholding the integrity of the electoral process . . . . But when a State seeks to uphold that interest
by restricting speech, the limitations on state authority imposed by the First Amendment are
manifestly implicated.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate,
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 138 (“[L]ibel law is premised on a special concern with protecting
individual reputation. That concern is not present with other types of false statements in public
debate. Of course, government does have an interest in protecting the quality of public debate. But
it would be difficult to explain why a broader restriction (reckless disregard rather than knowing
falsehood) is more necessary in the context of public debate than in the context of the judicial
process.”); see also Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of SelfRestraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 61 (2003) (“Tactics that restrict expressive liberties must give way
to strategies that successfully reconcile the perennial tension between individualized autonomy and
the interests of the body politic in fair and honest elections.”).
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from criticism.80 In fact, the First Amendment has the opposite effect,
recognizing a “profound national commitment” to protecting the people’s
right to criticize candidates for public office.81
The PDC also asserted an interest in preserving the integrity of
elections to justify the statute.82 Admittedly, a state may have a compelling
interest in preventing harm to elections.83 But the government does not, as
the majority asserted, have a legitimate interest in determining truth or
falsity in political debate.84 Nor is the government capable of “negotiating
the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech.”85 Indeed, in the
words of Justice Jackson, “‘[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is
to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public
mind . . . . In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth,
because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true
from the false for us.’”86 Thus, even if the government may punish false
and defamatory speech through defamation actions, the government has
no legitimate interest in appointing an agency to determine whether
statements uttered during a political campaign are false.87 The statute’s
insertion of a truth-finding government agency into the middle of a
political campaign conflicts with the fundamental thrust of the First
Amendment: encouraging “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on
public issues.88
80. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 830 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348).
81. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
82. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 830.
83. See id. at 830–31 (collecting cases recognizing compelling government interests in
preventing direct harm to elections); see also Davis v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 76 U.S.L.W. 4675 (June
26, 2008) (noting a compelling government interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of
corruption in elections, but finding that interest insufficient to justify the “substantial burden” on
First Amendment rights caused by the statute).
84. Id. at 829; see Stone, supra note 79, at 138, 140 (arguing that a law prohibiting false
statements of fact during public debate would be unconstitutional “because of the danger of putting
government in the position routinely to decide the truth or falsity of all statements in public
debate . . . . This danger stems from the possible effect of partisanship affecting the process at every
level. The very power to make such determinations invites abuse that could be profoundly
destructive to public debate.”).
85. Rickert II, 168 P.3d at 829.
86. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419–20 (1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
87. Stone, supra note 79, at 140 (arguing that allowing the government to punish false
statements during public debate “invites abuse that could be profoundly destructive to public
debate.”).
88. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); cf. Stone, supra note 79, at
139–40. But see William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 285, 300–22 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s recognition of a state’s interest
in preventing campaign distortion and voter alienation in the context of campaign finance laws
suggests that the Court would allow the same interests to justify state limitations on campaign
speech).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss4/5

12

Rodell: False Statements v. Free Debate: Is the First Amendment a License

2008]

Rickert v. Public Disclosure Com m ission

959

The Washington Supreme Court’s decision rightly calls into question
similar statutes nationwide. Many states, including Florida, have laws
substantially similar to Washington’s.89 These statutes all assert as
justification similar paternalistic concerns for protecting elections and
candidates.90 But these justifications cannot support government
censorship of political debate.91 Although many commentators claim that
electioneering behavior by political candidates has gotten out of hand,92
this problem has been around for decades.93 And in the instant case,
Rickert received her proper punishment for uttering a false statement about
her political opponent: she lost badly at the ballot box.94
In 2008, like in any election year, political candidates will straddle the
line between spinning facts and misstating them.95 But the American
89. See supra note 73.
90. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463(A) (2008); 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 304, § 1(3).
91. See Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 698–99 (Wash.
1998) (invalidating a prior version of Washington’s false-campaign-speech statute because the
state’s asserted compelling interest in “shield[ing] the public from falsehoods during a political
campaign is patronizing and paternalistic”).
92. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 20, at 759 n.36 (acknowledging that politics has always been
a nasty business, but stating that the “rancor of modern campaigns is qualitatively different because
of the presence of television”); Marshall, supra note 88, at 291 (noting that modern political
advertisements are “designed primarily to elicit emotional response rather than convey rational
persuasion, and are purposefully one-sided and manipulative”).
93. In 1949, one commentator stated: “Charges of gross incompetence, disregard of the
public interest, communist sympathies, and the like usually have filled the air; and hints of bribery,
embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent.” Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public
Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 875 (1949); see also George Chase, Note,
Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates for Office, 23 AM. L. REV. 346, 346 (1889) (describing
a similar political environment sixty years earlier).
94. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Tom Henderson, Mommy, He Told Fibs
About Me! Fine Him $1000, LEWISTON MORNING TRIBUNE (Idaho), July 5, 2006, at 6A (“If liars
are shooting themselves in the foot anyway, the lie carries its own punishment. People like Sheldon
can fight their own battles without asking Mommy—in the form of the state—to fight them
instead.”). Although Rickert may have lost anyway, getting caught in a lie about her opponent
certainly could not have improved her electability.
95. Perhaps the most memorable “spin” so far this season was Hillary Clinton’s recollection
of a trip to Bosnia while her husband was President. Hillary Clinton claimed: “I remember landing
under sniper fire. There was supposed to be some kind of a greeting ceremony at the airport, but
instead we just ran with our heads down to get into the vehicles to get to our base.” Katherine Q.
Seelye, Clinton ‘Misspoke’ About Bosnia Trip, Campaign Says, THE CAUCUS, N.Y. TIMES POLITICS
BLOG (Mar. 24, 2008), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/clinton-misspoke-aboutbosnia-trip-campaign-says/?scp=2-b&sq=hillary+clinton+sniper+lies&st=nyt (Mar. 24, 2008, 13:42
EST). However, photographs and videos taken at the greeting ceremony show that Hillary Clinton
was greeted on the tarmac by a smiling eight-year-old girl who read Clinton a poem. See Michael
Dobbs, Hillary’s Balkan Adventures, Part II, THE FACT CHECKER BLOG (Mar. 21, 2008),
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/fact-checker/2008/03/hillarys_balkan_adventures_par.html (Mar.
21, 2008, 06:00 EST). For a video containing footage of Clinton’s arrival in Bosnia and her
campaign comments, see CBS Expose s Hillar y C linton Bosnia Trip,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-6M41YqM_xk&feature=related (last visited June 29, 2008).
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electorate does not need its government to determine truth in political
debate. Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court should remind us of Justice
Brandeis’s words in Whitney v. California: the proper remedy is “more
speech, not enforced silence.”96

96. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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